We extend the literature on the deep determinants of economic development by focusing on life expectancy, instead of income per capita, as an indicator of economic development, and by examining the role of informal, as well as formal, institutions. Our empirical results suggest that formal and informal institutions are substitutes. Improving informal institutions has positive effects on life expectancy that are statistically significant for most countries and stronger than the effects of improving formal institutions. The gains from improving informal institutions are greatest for countries in which institutions are weakest. Geographical factors also help explain cross-country variation in life expectancy.
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I. Introduction
People in most developing countries suffer from poorer health and live shorter lives, on average, than people in rich countries. In 2005, average life expectancy at birth in Japan was 82 years compared to 35 years in Botswana and Lesotho. The aim of this paper is to follow the tradition of the literature on the deep determinants of economic development and examine how much of the cross-country variation in life expectancy can be explained by institutional and geographical variables.
In the deep determinants literature, factors such as physical and human capital per worker and technology, which appear in the aggregate production function, are themselves considered to be joint outcomes. They are 'proximate determinants' of development, variations in which require explanation. Deep determinants, by contrast, are variables that explain differences in the proximate determinants; they are the underlying, fundamental, or 'deep' determinants that shape these proximate outcomes, which, in turn, are reflected in variation in economic wellbeing across countries. For example, high-quality institutions such as laws protecting private property from expropriation (a deep determinant) are likely to lead to high levels of physical capital accumulation (a proximate determinant) and, hence, higher levels of income per capita.
Deep determinants are considered to be relatively slow-moving, durable characteristics of a society, such as its geography and the quality of its institutions, the influence of which have a pervasive effect on all aspects of development over long periods of time.
Income per capita is the standard proxy for economic development in this literature. In addition, the focus is almost exclusively on the role of formal, rather than informal, institutions in explaining cross-country differences in the level of development. Following North (1990) , formal institutions can be thought of as written rules and regulations, for example, property and contract law, whereas informal institutions include norms, conventions and the level of trust and cooperation within society. This paper extends the existing literature in two main ways.
Firstly, we focus on life expectancy as an alternative indicator of economic development.
Secondly, we examine the role of informal, as well as formal, institutions as a potential deep determinant of development.
Concepts relevant to the analysis of the role of informal institutions also feature in discussions of social capital and cultural economics (Knowles, 2007) . Social capital is a notoriously difficult term to define, but, at the risk of generalising to some extent, most definitions include the notions of trust, a shared set of cooperative norms, and networks between individuals (Putnam et al., 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997) . Trust and norms of generalised morality also feature in work on the economics of culture (Platteau, 1994a, b; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2007) . Given the similarities between social capital and informal institutions, it should come as no surprise that our empirical proxies for informal institutions reflect their common heritage.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly reviews existing work on the deep determinants of development, along with some relevant studies on the effects of social capital on health outcomes across countries. Section III analyses why institutions (both formal and informal) and geography may be expected to affect health outcomes. Our empirical results are presented in Section IV, with Section V concluding.
II. Deep Determinants of Economic Development
Beginning with Hall and Jones (1999) , several papers have analysed the relative importance of institutions and geographical factors in explaining cross-country differences in income per capita (for example, Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al. 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Sachs, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005 ).
The quality of institutions is typically measured using survey data on variables such as the degree of protection against expropriation or the extent to which contracts are enforceable.
Measures of geography include distance from the equator, whether or not a country is landlocked and the proportion of the population that is at risk of contracting malaria. Early influential studies (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004) emphasise the importance of institutions, arguing that, after controlling for institutional quality, geography has little direct effect on income. However, more recent contributions (for example, Sachs 2003; Olsson and Hibbs 2005; Carstensen and Gundlach, 2006 ) find evidence of a stronger role for geographical variables.
A key issue in the deep determinants literature is the need to deal with potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Although geographical variables such as distance from the equator and mean temperature are exogenous, the risk of malaria, for example, is potentially endogenous as there are steps richer countries can take to reduce malaria risk. Institutions are also potentially endogenous as richer countries are likely to demand, and are more able to afford, better quality institutions. For this reason, estimates are typically obtained using instrumental variables (IV) methods.
The deep determinants literature focuses on formal, rather than informal, institutions. Most deep determinants studies cite North's (1990: 3) seminal definition of institutions as 'the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, … the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'. However, North emphasised that not only formal institutions (such as laws and regulations enacted by governments) but also informal institutions (such as conventions, norms and codes of behaviour) are important determinants of economic performance. Informal institutions expected to have a positive effect on economic development include norms of trust and reciprocity, which underpin market transactions. As we argue below, informal institutions are also likely to be determinants of health indicators such as life expectancy.
A few existing studies do consider a role for informal institutions or social capital in explaining cross-country differences in income or health status. Tabellini (2007) analyses the effect of culture on per capita output across regions in European countries, but his paper also includes some cross-country regressions examining relationships between different indicators of culture and governance, that is formal institutions. Tabellini's measure of culture includes survey-based information on the extent of trust, whether people believe children should be taught to respect others, whether they should be taught to be obedient (which Tabellini argues will have a negative effect on economic performance), and whether people believe they have control over their own destiny. Some of these variables could also be considered as measures of social capital or informal institutions, and are used in our empirical work. Tabellini's paper makes a strong case for the relevance of values and behavioural norms in explaining different experiences of economic development, but it does not adopt a deep determinants perspective, as neither formal institutions nor geographical characteristics are included as regressors explaining regional per capita income. Voigt and Park (2008) examine the effects of separate proxies for formal institutions and social capital on total factor productivity (TFP) in a cross-country empirical analysis. They examine the direct effects of values and norms on TFP and their indirect effects via formal institutions and an indicator of social capital. In turn, social capital is assumed to affect formal institutions but not to directly affect TFP. Their modelling framework, an extension of that of Hall and Jones (1999) , therefore imposes untested exclusion restrictions on the effect of social capital on TFP and also of formal institutions on social capital.
The approach adopted by Ahlerup et al. (2008) is the most closely related to ours, in that the explanatory variables in their model include a measure of formal institutions (covering bureaucratic quality, law and order, and corruption), social capital (measured as generalised trust) and their multiplicative interaction. However, the focus of their cross-country empirical analysis is on explaining the growth of GDP per capita (from 1995-2005) or the rate of investment, not health status. Also, rather than using a deep determinants approach, they fit a Barro-type growth regression that includes base-period income, investment prices and human capital (proxied by life expectancy). 1 Their results imply that formal institutions and trust are substitutes in terms of enhancing growth; consequently, social capital has a stronger positive effect on growth for countries with lower quality formal institutions.
In assessing the role of formal institutions on economic development, most deep determinants studies proxy the latter by income per capita. However, a small number of studies, acknowledging that income per capita may be an imperfect proxy, examine the determinants of alternative measures of economic development. Batten and Martina (2007) analyse the effect of formal institutions and geography, as well as the degree of trade openness, on the Human Development Index and find the proportion of the population at risk of contracting malaria to be the most important deep determinant. Jones et al. (2007) analyse the effect of formal institutions and some aspects of geography on life expectancy and school enrolment rates. They find formal institutions to be a key predictor of life expectancy, but do not consider informal institutions. Mean temperature and the extent to which a country is landlocked do not have statistically significant effects. They do not include malaria risk as an explanatory variable in their life expectancy equation, arguing that malaria is a proximate, rather than deep determinant of life expectancy. Galor and Moav (2007) find that the number of years since the ancestors of a country's population experienced the Neolithic Revolution is significantly positively correlated with contemporary life expectancy. Among their control variables are distance from the equator and a measure of formal institutions, both of which have statistically significant effects in some specifications.
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There is also a more extensive literature, reviewed in Islam et al (2006) Lynch et al. (2001) find some evidence of a significant correlation between some forms of social capital and specific causes of mortality, such as coronary heart disease. The lack of statistical significance of social capital may be the result of including other proximate determinants and income, which could be controlling for some of the effects of social capital. Also, the possibility of bias due to endogeneity of several of the explanatory variables is not considered.
Compared to the studies discussed above, our approach adopts a health-status measure, life expectancy, as an alternative proxy measure for economic development, and examines the effects of formal and informal institutions, and their interaction, in a deep determinants framework.
III. The Effects of Geography and Institutions on Health
Geography and Health
The causal effects of geographical location on health status involve several direct and indirect mechanisms. The direct effects are the most obvious: many diseases are more prevalent in tropical areas (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Gallup et al., 1999; Sachs 2001 Sachs , 2003 . The spatial distribution of human pathogens displays what biologists term a 'latitudinal species diversity gradient'; that is, the number of parasitic and infectious disease species is inversely related to latitude, and climatic rather than socio-economic factors are primarily responsible for this pattern (Guernier et al., 2004) . Landes (1998: 7) notes that '[h]eat, especially year round heat, … encourages the proliferation of life forms hostile to man'. Sachs (2001 Sachs ( , 2003 emphasises the particularly pernicious effects of malaria on health and productivity. This is essentially a tropical disease as an ambient temperature of at least 18°C is required for anopholene mosquitoes, the crucial vectors in malaria transmission, to be infective (Sachs, 2001) . By contrast, winter frosts, lacking in tropical areas except at high altitudes, act as an important control on the spread of many parasites, pathogens and pests (Masters and McMillan, 2001 ).
The maximum range of precipitation is strongly correlated with pathogen diversity (Guernier et al., 2004 ) and large within-year variation in precipitation is another feature of tropical areas. In our empirical work, we use the proportion of a country's area that lies in the tropics as an explanatory variable, but also examine absolute latitude as an alternative summary measure of tropical geographical location, as this variable has been used in several deep determinants studies of income per capita.
Climate and other aspects of geography also have indirect effects on health. The extreme heat and humidity in tropical countries contributes to low soil fertility and low agricultural productivity (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs 2001) . This can have adverse effects on the adequacy of nutritional standards and consequent implications for susceptibility to disease for children and adults.
Geographical factors that affect income per capita are also likely to have an effect on health.
Cross-country studies focusing on long-run effects usually find a positive association between income and health, although there is a lack of consensus on whether the effect is predominantly from income to health (Pritchett and Summers, 1996) or bi-directional Owen, 1995, 1997; Bloom and Canning, 2000; Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001 ).
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On either interpretation, higher levels of income per capita improve health status. 4 For example, the extent to which a country has access to the sea is included as a geographical determinant of income in some empirical studies, primarily on the grounds that lack of access to the coast can hamper openness to trade (Gallup et al., 1999) . This can also cause countries to be dependent on good political relations with their neighbours and reliant on the latter's infrastructure, administrative policies and political stability (Faye et al., 2004) . If access to a coastline has implications for income per capita, then, to the extent that income affects health, there will be indirect effects on health status. More specifically, better access to trade can facilitate diffusion of medical knowledge and importing of new technologies, medicines and medical resources that improve health outcomes (Owen and Wu, 2007; Papageorgiou et al., 2007) . There may also be even more direct effects on health if access to the coast affects diet or disease ecology and methods of controlling vectors (McArthur and Sachs, 2001 ).
Institutions and Health
Empirical studies in the deep determinants literature emphasise the significance of the effect of formal institutions on income per capita. To the extent that additional income provides resources to improve health status, as discussed above, then better quality formal institutions will have indirect effects, via income, in improving health status.
More directly, the quality of institutions is important for the provision of public goods, such as a health system. Effective state provision of a tax-funded public health system and supporting public health infrastructure (such as water and sanitation) is usually associated with a sufficiently strong tax base, adequate organizational capacity and a well-developed institutional environment, reflected in secure property rights, effective government and control over corruption (Fafchamps, 2006) . In poorer countries, in addition to a lack of resources, corruption (manifested in state-provided drugs not reaching patients), absenteeism among health workers (especially in rural areas), a lack of adequate monitoring and regulation of private sector providers, and general bureaucratic inefficiency adversely affect the quality of delivery of health services (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Cutler et al., 2006) . Poor-quality institutions may contribute to the finding of no statistically and numerically significant relationship between health spending and health outcomes in some empirical studies (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999) . In extreme situations, where the inadequacy of institutions leads to internal or crossborder conflict and political instability, violence may lead directly to deaths, injuries and destruction of health facilities.
If formal institutions are inadequately developed, informal institutions can act as a substitute (Fafchamps, 2006) . For example, religious and political groups, relying on interpersonal trust and in-group leadership, can build clinics and hospitals with a view to providing comprehensive primary health care for local communities. Whereas informal institutions are generally considered to be a second-best solution compared to the rule of law and effective governance, rapid introduction of the latter into poor countries is difficult and can have adverse consequences (Dixit, 2004) . In developing countries, social relations between people are often crucial for effective delivery of health care (Woolcock and Radin, 2008) .
In principle, social capital can, in different circumstances, either be a substitute or a complement for formal institutions in the provision of public goods (Fafchamps, 2006) . Indeed, formal and informal institutions could well be substitutes at a macro level (in cross-country regressions) and complements at the micro level, if, for example, communities supplement a state-funded health system, based on good-quality formal institutions, with local initiatives and voluntary involvement that improves the quality of local health care and service provision.
IV. Empirical Results
To assess the statistical and quantitative significance of the effects of both formal and informal institutions, and geographical factors, in a deep determinants framework, we obtain parameter estimates for the following model
in which LE is life expectancy at birth in 2005, Formal a measure of formal institutions,
Informal a measure of informal institutions, TropicArea the proportion of land area within the tropics, Land100km the proportion of land area within 100km of the coast, Africa a dummy variable equal to one if a country is in Africa, Communist a dummy variable for countries with a communist legacy and ε a country-specific error term. Subscript i denotes country i.
The dependent variable is a logarithmic transformation of the shortfall of average life expectancy at birth from 85 years. This transformation allows for a biological upper bound for average life expectancy in the sample Owen, 1995, 1997) and reduces heteroskedasticity in the errors. Survey (WVS) . Trust, Control and Respect are all included in Tabellini's (2007) index of culture, discussed in Section II, while Trust and Control are equivalent to two of the six alternative proxies for the 'psychosocial environment' adopted by Lynch et al. (2001) .
The parameters β 1 and β 2 are hypothesised to be positive. Including an interaction term, the product of Formal and Informal, allows us to test whether there is complementarity (β 3 > 0) or substitutability (β 3 < 0) between formal and informal institutions.
TropicArea and Land100km are geographical deep determinants that have been used in studies of income levels (for example, Gallup et al., 1999; Sachs 2003) and for which data availability does not impose additional constraints on sample size. Because African countries overwhelmingly dominate the bottom end of the distribution of average life expectancy across countries, an African dummy variable is included. A dummy variable for a communist legacy (equivalent to the socialist legal origin dummy of La Porta et al. (1999) ) is included to pick up the long-term effects on health status of aspects of the social and economic structure of previously communist countries that may not be adequately reflected in the institutions measures.
Several studies in the deep determinants literature include the proportion of the population at risk of malaria as a geographical deep determinant of income per capita (for example, Sachs, 2003; Carstensen and Gundlach, 2006 ). In the current context, the risk of catching a potentially fatal illness is more appropriately considered as a joint outcome with life expectancy. Hence, we do not include malaria risk as a potential deep determinant in our benchmark specification in equation (1) but investigate the implications of including it in our later robustness analysis.
[ Figure 1 shows, the proxy measures for the two categories of institutions are far from perfectly correlated, suggesting there may be additional informational content in the informal institutions variable.
[ Figure 1 about here]
TropicArea, Land100km, Africa and Communist are treated as exogenous, but Formal and
Informal are both potentially endogenous. More highly developed countries, in which people live longer, are more able to invest in higher quality formal institutions. If formal and informal institutions are substitutes, and the former are less well developed, the returns to the latter are higher, so that more effort is likely to be made to create social capital (Fafchamps, 2006) . Also, in countries where average health status is more favourable, people may be more inclined to believe that they have control over their lives. A population with a higher average life expectancy and a higher average age may be more trusting, if trust in others increases with age, as the results in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) suggest. With endogenous explanatory variables, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) would be potentially biased and not reflect the causal effect of institutions on health. To address such concerns, and to reduce attenuation bias due to measurement error, we use IV estimation methods, drawing on a variety of instruments used in the literature on the deep determinants of income levels.
StateHist is an index of 'state antiquity' constructed by Bockstette et al. (2002) . Values of
StateHist lie between zero and one, with higher values indicating longer spans of state antiquity.
Countries with a long state history are likely to have had the time to develop higher quality formal institutions. StateHist is correlated with a number of measures of formal institutions (Bockstette et al., 2002) , suggesting it should be a good instrument for our purposes. Hall and Jones (1999) argue that EngFrac, the proportion of the population speaking English, and EurFrac, the proportion of the population speaking one of five major Western
European languages (including English), proxy for the degree of Western European influence
and hence the quality of formal institutions, which were typically imported from Western
Europe. Although their argument is somewhat Eurocentric, their data show a significant positive correlation between formal institutions and both EngFrac and EurFrac. We include EngFrac in our instrument set, but not EurFrac which adds relatively little additional explanatory power in the implied first-stage regressions.
The dummy variable, EngLegor, indicates whether a country has a common law system, reflecting an English legal origin. Legal origin is correlated with a wide range of legal and regulatory outcomes that have important consequences for economic and social outcomes (La Porta et al., 1999 Porta et al., , 2008 . In particular, common law countries with an English legal origin tend to have stronger protection of property rights and better enforcement of contracts than do countries with a more prescriptive civil law, particularly of French legal origin. La Porta et al. (2008: 286) characterise legal origin as 'a style of social control of economic life … In strong form, … we argue that common law stands for the strategy of social control that seeks to support private market outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to replace such outcomes with statedesired allocations.'
We also use the proportions of the population professing to be Protestant, Catholic and (Putnam et al., 1993; Inglehart and Baker, 2000) . Jones (1997: 766) ProtFrac, CathFrac and MuslimFrac in our instrument set.
Overall, StateHist, EngFrac and EngLegor are selected primarily due to prior arguments that they will act as good instruments for formal institutions, but they are also correlated with informal institutions (with significant t-values in first-stage regressions for Informal). Similarly, ProtFrac, CathFrac and MuslimFrac, included primarily as instruments for informal institutions, also add explanatory power as instruments for formal institutions (with significant t-values in first-stage regressions for Formal).
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As well as being relevant, that is, having high partial correlations with the endogenous explanatory variables, consistency of IV estimators requires the instruments to be exogenous, that is, uncorrelated with the error term (at least asymptotically). This requires that the instruments do not have direct effects on health status and are not correlated with omitted relevant variables. Not surprisingly, concerns about the validity of implied exclusion restrictions are common in cross-country applications of IV methods. As there are more instruments than endogenous variables, we report tests of overidentifying restrictions (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982) . These provide a test, although not necessarily powerful, of the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors in a correctly specified model.
A common problem with IV estimation of cross-country relationships in the growth and development literature is the relatively weak partial correlations between endogenous regressors and instruments. If instruments are weak, two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates can exhibit severe finite-sample bias, especially when the degree of endogeneity is strong; also, their finitesample distribution can be very different from their asymptotic distribution, distorting the size of tests and the coverage of confidence intervals (Andrews and Stock, 2007) .
For 2SLS estimation of the model in that 'with few instruments the bias of LIML is very small once the concentration parameter exceeds 10, and that the variance of LIML is quite small once the concentration parameter exceeds 20'. The models in Table 2 [ Table 3 about here]
We examine the robustness of our results to variation in the method of estimation and to inclusion of additional regressors. In Table 3 , we report results for different estimation methods applied to the basic model in Table 2 , column (iii). Table 2 do not reject the null of homoskedasticity at conventional significance levels. However, as the test does not consider all possible forms for heteroskedasticity, we consider the sensitivity of the results to estimation methods that allow for less specific forms of heteroskedasticity. Column (iii) in Table 3 reports two-step GMM estimates, which are efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. For comparison, column (ii) reports two-step GMM based on the assumption of homoskedastic errors. Results for the continuously updated estimator (CUE) of Hansen et al. (1996) , which generalises the LIML estimator to departures from homoskedasticity, are reported in column (iv). Compared to the Fuller(1) results in column (iii) in Table 2 , the results in Table 3 display only relatively minor changers in estimated coefficients and marginal significance levels across the different estimation methods.
[ Table 4 about here]
In Table 4 we check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional variables in the baseline model. Income inequality is arguably better thought of as an outcome, jointly determined along with average income levels, rather than a deep determinant of development.
Nevertheless, there is an extensive literature on the effects of income inequality on health outcomes, reviewed in Deaton (2003) . Therefore, in column (i), we examine the effects of adding the Gini coefficient for income inequality, Gini, to the model. 13 The estimated effect of income inequality is negative and statistically significant, but the changes in the estimated effects of the institutions variables are relatively minor; the most noticeable difference is an increase in the absolute size of the coefficient on the Communist dummy. Thus, life expectancy is lower in countries where inequality is higher, even after controlling for the informal institutional environment. However, in column (i), Gini is included as an exogenous variable; if it is treated as an endogenous variable, then, with the same instrument set, Gini no longer has a statistically significant effect but all other coefficients are statistically significant, including that on Communist, and little changed compared to the benchmark model (results not reported).
Openness, or the degree of integration with world markets, is often considered as a potential deep determinant of income levels. Owen and Wu (2007) As noted in our discussion of equation (1), we do not include malaria risk, Malfal, as a deep determinant of health in our benchmark specification, regarding it instead as a proximate determinant. However, we check whether its inclusion affects the estimates of the other parameters (in column (iii)), adding to our instrument set the malaria ecology index, ME, used by Sachs (2003) . Not surprisingly, the asymptotic t-values for the coefficients on TropicArea and Africa are reduced because of the prevalence of malaria in tropical areas, particularly in Africa. However, the coefficients on the institutions variables remain largely unaffected.
In column (iv) we include average latitude, AvLat, instead of TropicArea. Latitude has been widely used as a proxy for a country's geographical location in deep determinants studies (for example, Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Fielding and Torres, 2008) . Again, the coefficients on the institutions variables change relatively little.
In columns (v) and (vi) we examine the sensitivity of the results to using alternative 
V. Conclusions
The existing literature on the deep determinants of economic development adopts an overly narrow perspective. It focuses almost exclusively on levels of income per capita as the key indicator of development. It also emphasises the role of formal institutions, especially those relating to the protection of property rights and the rule of law, neglecting consideration of informal institutions, such as conventions, norms and levels of trust and cooperation within society. In this paper, we therefore examine an alternative indicator of development, life expectancy at birth, and include measures for the quality of both formal and informal institutions among its potential deep determinants.
Formal and informal institutions could, in principle, act as substitutes or complements, an issue we investigate by including a multiplicative interaction term in our empirical model. Our cross-country results suggest that they are substitutes at the aggregate level, a similar result to that found by Ahlerup et al. (2008) Although it is unwise to jump from cross-country aggregate empirical results to policy, it is not uncommon to hear claims that improvements in institutional quality hold the key to successful economic development. Our results suggest that, if results from the deep determinants literature are to be used to emphasise the importance of institutions, then the focus needs to be broadened to include informal institutions and the interaction between formal and informal institutions. For most countries, improvement in informal institutions appears to have more significant positive effects on health status compared to improving formal institutions, and the returns from improving informal institutions are most valuable for developing countries in which institutions are currently weakest.
Notes 1 Zak and Knack (2001) also estimate growth models that include both formal institutions and generalised trust as explanatory variables. Bjørnskov et al. (2008) do the same in modelling cross-country variation in self-reported life satisfaction. Unlike Ahlerup et al. (2008) , neither of these studies allows for an interaction term between the two types of institutions, thus ruling out direct consideration of substitutability or complementarity. 2 Other cross-country studies that find significant effects of measures of formal institutions on health status include Lazarova and Mosca (2007) and Klomp and de Haan (2008) , but neither of these considers the possible effects of informal institutions or social capital, and they include income and other proximate determinants of health as explanatory variables.
3 One example of a mechanism through which geography-induced variations in health can affect income per capita in the longer run is through investment in human capital. Sachs and Malaney (2002) summarise some of the mechanisms by which malaria, for example, affects human capital acquisition, including school absenteeism and impairment of cognitive development. 4 In contrast, some studies (for example, Cutler et al., 2006) argue that the role of income in improving health is often overstated. Instead, they emphasise the importance of knowledge and technology in enhancing both health and income. 5 These measures of different dimensions of institutional quality (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) are compiled by the World Bank from a wide variety of sources (Kaufmann et al., 2007) are often used as proxies for formal institutions in studies of the deep determinants of development (for example, Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Carstensen and Gundlach, 2006) . We focus on results for the mean measure. Aggregation is likely to reduce imprecision due to measurement error in the individual components. Also, the different components appear to measure essentially the same underlying concept, so averaging is appropriate (Langbein and Knack, 2008) . 6 Settler mortality, a widely used instrument for formal institutions proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001) , is not included in our instrument set because the useable sample, formed by the intersection of countries for which data are available on settler mortality and the WVS measures of informal institutions, would be substantially reduced.
7 Stock and Yogo (2005) derive critical values for different values of the number of included endogenous regressors (n), the number of (excluded) instrumental variables (K 2 ) and the desired maximal size of a 5 percent Wald test if using 2SLS. Stock and Yogo's tabulated critical values are for n up to 2, but, using the extended set of critical values for 2SLS in Batten and Martina (2007) with n = 3 and K 2 = 6, a value of the Cragg-Donald F-statistic, CD-F = 1.97 implies that the null hypothesis of weak instruments is not rejected in the case in which the maximum 2SLS size is no more than 15 percent, corresponding to a maximum size distortion of 10 percent.
8 Different variants of the Fuller estimator arise from the choice of the Fuller parameter, α.
Choosing α = 1 gives an estimator with a zero higher-order mean bias, whereas α = 4 leads to non-zero bias but a smaller mean squared error (Fuller, 1977) . The estimates reported are for the Fuller estimator with α = 1, which Fuller recommends for hypothesis testing. However, we also examine the sensitivity of the results to setting α = 4. 9 Fuller estimates with Bekker standard errors are computed in TSP, version 5.0; all other estimates and test statistics are obtained using the ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2007) 
